Online Conference 5-11 July 2021
February 2–7, 2027
Vienna, Austria
Parallel Papers Session
Date & Time: to be announced
Paper code: PP27H
Presenter: Jonathan Ames
Moderator: to be announced
Jonathan Ames
Jonathan Ames
Clinical psychologist with over 40 years practice experience, seeing individuals, families and small groups. Have also consulted to small family businesses having to sort
professional and personal relationships. Have been licensed in New Zealand, Kentucky and currently in New York. Also worked in computer industry; currently considering human adaptation to
technology – and vice versa.
Public responses to AI increasingly read as terror: p(Doom) anxieties, fears for democratic institutions and shared truth, an unmoored sense of the fake, and a diffuse loss of control — including the loss of a stable link between self and avatar. This paper asks what psychoanalytic accounts of attachment and projection can add to that picture — not as diagnosis alone, but as a basis for practical tools analysts and consultants can use to help individuals and organizations actually work with AI. A diagnosis here is less a fixed label than a locating device: like finding which part of a door or frame is catching before it will close, it points toward adjustment, not disease. In keeping with this meeting's theme of incompleteness, the paper treats its central questions as unfinished business to be worked on collaboratively, not as gaps to be resolved before arrival.
Attachment theory (Ainsworth's Strange Situation; Main's secure and insecure variants) frames an opening question: do early patterns of nurturance and holding shape how individuals and organizations come to relate to AI — as secure exploration, anxious over-reliance, avoidant dismissal, or disorganized oscillation? The paper's central lens is Bion's container/contained function, read through Winnicott's holding environment: what would it mean for an AI system, or the institutions deploying it, to function as container for the anxieties AI itself provokes — and can containment operate without a subject capable of dread? Klein's positions, Ogden's projective identification, and Mitchell's hope/dread polarities serve as comparative lenses, testing whether trans-personal psychic processes observed between humans extend to human-machine interaction, or fail instructively.
A second, socio-structural register — Arendt on totalitarian banality, Nash on settlers' terror before wilderness, Doctorow on platform "enshittification" — asks whether institutional projections onto AI echo older projections onto the unknown, and whether AI companies' own public engagement with these questions leaves room for convergence between organizational-psychoanalytic consultation and AI engineering practice.
Key questions: Do attachment styles predict how individuals and organizations "metabolize" AI? Can Bion's container/contained function operate in human-AI interaction? Does projective identification occur trans-personally with a non-human interlocutor? Does institutional "enshittification" reflect organizational-level paranoid-schizoid regression?
This paper is aimed at ISPSO members and colleagues from organizational consultation, clinical practice, and technology backgrounds with an interest in psychoanalytic readings of technology and institutional life; no prior technical knowledge of AI is assumed. Working methods: a didactic presentation of the theoretical framework and key questions, followed by structured small- and large-group discussion in which participants test these lenses against their own clinical, consulting, or technological experience. Participants will leave able to distinguish attachment-based patterns of response to AI, apply Bion's container/contained framework to organizational anxiety about AI, and identify concrete openings for collaboration between psychoanalytic consultation and AI engineering practice.